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The Tuna Bond Scandal: The Continued Lack of 




Abstract: The UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing provide inter alia that creditors should ensure debt contracts are duly 
authorised, yet the Mozambique Tuna Bond Scandal suggests that in the market for private 
bank-to-state credit facilities agreements there is still work to do. This article presents 
empirical evidence suggesting growth in the amount of private bank-to-state loans and 
argues that this growth, combined with a lack of transparency, will lead to increasing 
numbers of legal disputes over want and abuse of official authority. The English law 
doctrines of ultra vires contracting in private international law and abuse of agent 
authority, usually applied in the context of corruption, are considered, and various reforms 
are proposed, including a transparency register and a legislative reversal of presumption 
of agent authority.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 and 20141 three Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) controlled by the Republic of Mozambique 
entered into contracts with three companies ultimately controlled by Mr Iskandar Safa (the Privinvest 
Companies) for the supply of fishing boats, security and facilities linked to the exploitation of the tuna 
fisheries of the Mozambique’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean. These purchases were 
financed by two credit facilities agreements in the London form (CFAs) and a third private placement 
loan note style agreement also fairly standard in London financial practice (together the Finance 
Agreements). The leading lenders under the Finance Agreements were various entities of the Swiss 
bank, Credit Suisse, and the deals were arranged out of Credit Suisse’s London branch: Credit Suisse 
Europe. The liabilities of the three SPVs under the Finance Agreements – including USD1.762bn of 
principal – were backed by sovereign guarantees under which the Republic was primary guarantor.  
It subsequently became apparent that something was amiss. Mozambique claimed to have no 
knowledge of these transactions, that it had never approved any aspect of them nor received value. 
Mozambique alleges2 among other things that certain of its officials ‘did not have authority to sign the 
sovereign guarantees, which were unconstitutional and illegal under Mozambican law’ and that the 
signing of the guarantees was linked both to (i) ‘large bribes [paid] to government officials’; and (ii) 
the supply agreements between the SPVs and the Privinvest Companies, all as part of an ‘unlawful 
means conspiracy’. These claims are denied. Mozambique – a Low Income Country3 – faces a bill for 
some USD2bn without, it claims, having ever been conferred a material benefit. Thus during Autumn 
2019, while Credit Suisse had financed the asset purchases and had been less than diligent in 
investigating the authority of the signatories of the guarantees given by the Republic, it was initially 
believed that Credit Suisse was not (and specifically, certain of its employees were not) involved in the 
overarching conspiracy.  
Since this article was initially prepared for publication, the Tuna Bond Scandal has moved on. It is 
worth highlighting two developments. First, in December 2018 the US Department of Justice 
commenced criminal proceedings against certain Credit Suisse Europe employees and, during the 
course of 2019, all but one admitted money laundering offences linked to the large ‘commission’ 
payments they processed (and skimmed) from Mr Safa’s entities to various Mozambican officials.4 
While it is denied, Mozambique claims that these Credit Suisse employees also had knowledge of all 
material aspects of the conspiracy. Second, as part of several claims by Mozambique in the High Court 
of England & Wales which have subsequently been joined, Mozambique claims damages, for among 
other things unlawful means conspiracy, against Mr Safa, the Privinvest Companies, Credit Suisse and 
others. On 11 March 2021 the English Court of Appeal determined5 that these claims were bound to 
considered by Swiss arbitral tribunal under an arbitration agreement between the Privinvest Companies 
and the SPVs. It remains open whether Mozambique is bound by this arbitration agreement.  
These events, particularly the admissions of guilt by the Credit Suisse employees, have shifted the 
initial legal analysis away from one focused on agency and abuse of power and onto unlawful means 
conspiracy, but all these questions remain in issue, and may once again become central with regards to 
claims against Credit Suisse if the bank and its now former employees make out their defence that they 
 
1 The facts are based on the summary by Carr LJ, in The Republic of Mozambique v Credit Suisse International 
and Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 329. 
2 Ibid., at [22], [41]. 
3 Per the IMF List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries as of April 30, 2021. 
4 Brendan Pierson, ‘Ex-Credit Suisse banker pleads guilty to U.S. charge over Mozambique loan’ Reuters (20 
May 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-credit-suisse-charges-idUSKCN1SQ2E1 (last 
accessed 13 July 2021). 
5 Mozambique v CSI (2021) above n 1. 
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knew nothing of the wider conspiracy. Hence the research in this article remains pertinent to the Tuna 
Bond Scandal, though, as stated earlier, the conclusions drawn are intended to be of general relevance. 
The hypothesis of this article is that the English law of powers and agency as it relates to sovereign 
states parties to CFAs between such states and private commercial parties (Bank-to-State CFAs), 
wrongly distributes the risk of an agent’s abuse of power onto the state, and consequently the law as it 
stands will come under increasing pressure given the evidence of an increase in these types of contracts, 
unless there is legislative intervention to remedy current doctrine. The hypothesis suggests three 
research questions which form the backbone of this article:  
(a) To what extent do empirical data establish that sovereign states are making increasing use of 
relatively non-transparent private commercial party financing via Bank-to-State CFAs, rather 
than the more traditional public issuance of bonds and official debt (Part II)?  
(b) Building on the Meron’s analysis of state responsibility, Buchheit et al.’s account of contractual 
responsibility under New York law,6 and Jeff King’s related analysis of the enforceability of 
loan contracts having unlawful purposes,7 what is the current English law of powers and agency 
as it relates to sovereign states entering into finance contracts, and on which party does the risk 
of agent abuse of power fall (Part III)?  
(c) Given the legal deficiencies and empirical evidence, what possible emendations to the English 
law of agency in these cases might counter the mischief of official agents and others conspiring 
to abuse their power when negotiating Bank-to-State CFAs (Part IV)? 
This article builds both on modern legal histories of the transactions and doctrine underpinning 
loans made to states, and, with its Mozambican-focus, country-specific analyses, which combine several 
legal subdisciplines: the private (international) law of loan agreements;8 work on the G20 and Paris 
Club 2020 Debt-Service Suspension Initiative; 9 country-specific analyses of sovereign financing;10 and 
work on the Highly-Indebted Poor Country debt forgiveness programme which foreshadows the move 
to Bank-to-State Debt.11 This article adds to this literature by focusing on Mozambique, which to date 
has rather been the subject of studies on internal corruption.12 One should also note an innovative study13 
of creditor – China and its banks – rather than debtor state legal practices. 
 
6 Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati & Robert B Thompson, ‘The Dilemma of Odious Debts’ 56 Duke Law Journal 
1201-1262 (2007). 
7 Jeff King, The Doctrine of Odious Debt in International Law: A Restatement (Cambridge: CUP, 2016). 
8 Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, ‘Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’ 73(4) Law & Contemporary 
Problems 62-92 (2010). 
9 See Schwan Badirou Gafari & Arthur Bauer, l’Action du Club de Paris et du G20 en matière de traitement de 
dette à l’heure de la Covid-19 141 Revue d'Économie Financière 255-270 (2021); Juuso Kaaresvirta & Helinä 
Laakkonen, ‘China as an international creditor’ 5 BOFIT Policy Brief  3-13 (2021).  
10 Thomas Laryea, ‘Donegal v Zambia and the Persistent Debt Problems of Low-Income Countries’ 73(4) Law & 
Contemporary Problems 193-200 (2010), collected together with articles by: Manuel Monteaguado (Peru) 201-
240, Jeanne C. Oliver (Argentina) 241-250, Arturo C. Porzecanski (Ecuador) 251-272, and Mark H. Stumpf 
(Bosnia) 301-316. 
11 Celine Tan, 'Reframing the debate: the debt relief initiative and new normative values in the governance of third 
world debt' 10(2) International Journal of Law in Context (2014) 249-272; Leonie F. Guder, The Administration 
of Debt Relief by the International Financial Institutions: A Legal Reconstruction of the HIPC Initiative 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2009); Mark A. Walker & Barthélemy Faye, Sovereign Debt Renegotiation: Restructuring 
the Commercial Debt of HIPC Debtor Countries, 73(4) Law & Contemporary Problems 317-324 (2010). 
12 David Stasavage, ‘Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Mozambique in Transition’ 37(3) Journal of 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 65-97 (1999). For a recent economic survey of corruption across 
Mozambican society see Inge Tvedten and Rachi Picardo ‘“Goats eat where they are tied up”: Illicit and Habitual 
Corruption in Mozambique’ 45(158) Review of African Political Economy 541-557 (2018). 
13 Anna Gelpern et al., ‘How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments’ 
Center for Global Development Working Paper 573 (31 March 2021). 
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The second limb of this article analyses a specific doctrinal issue relating to lending to sovereigns: 
where a credit facilities agreement is signed in abuse of authority by a corrupt official. This particular 
wrong would therefore fall foul of the 2012 restatement of UNCTAD Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing,14 Principle 3 of which provides that: 
Lenders have a responsibility to determine, to the best of their ability, whether the financing has been 
appropriately authorized and whether the resulting credit agreements are valid and enforceable under 
relevant jurisdiction/s.  
There Michael Waibel argues that the Principles ‘reflect, to a considerable degree, how states and 
creditors of states act’,15 and while Waibel’s focus is primarily on the restructuring aspects of these 
Principles, there is a need for empirical analysis of actual loan agreements to assess whether compliance 
with Principle 3 is indeed the norm. Anna Gelpern is more circumspect,16 writing ‘[a]gency problems, 
time inconsistency, information asymmetries, and moral hazard are perennial risks in sovereign lending 
and borrowing. Public officials borrow in the name of the people, but not in their interest’.17 She argues 
that there is a need for ‘substantive and technical elaboration over time,’ and that the Principles could 
support best practices, due diligence and domestic legislative efforts.18 One attempt at this augmentation 
has been the Institute of International Finance’s 2017 Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency,19 
but while expanding on the notion of full-disclosure they too are voluntary, In analysing one such 
substantive and technical aspect, and in proposing binding legislative reform, this article also builds on 
Gelpern’s call to action in concrete ways.  
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF GROWTH IN BANK-TO-STATE 
LOANS 
 The evidence 
1.  Typology 
As stated above, we are concerned with a very specific subset of what the IMF generally classifies as 
‘loans’.20 Following legal practice, four categories can be distinguished: 
Credit Facilities Agreement (CFA) means (a) any kind of loan, interest on any loan, guarantee 
or indemnity, and any other kind of accommodation or facility in the nature of credit, and (b) 
any fee relating to a matter specified in (a), structured to be bilateral or (part-)syndicated. 
Multilateral Agency (MLA) means international institutions with governmental membership 
which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid 
recipient countries, and which include multilateral development banks.21 
 
14 Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf (last accessed 1 July 
2021). 
15 Michael Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air? Tracing the Origins of the UNCTAD Principles of Customary International 
Law’ in Carlos Espósito et al. (eds.), Sovereign Financing and International Law: The UNCTAD Principles on 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 88-112, at 111. 
16 Anna Gelpern, ‘Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles and Promoting Responsible Sovereign 
lending and Borrowing’ in Esposito, Sovereign Financing, 347-382. 
17 Ibid. 347-348. 
18 Ibid. 381. 
19 Available at https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/Principles%20for%20Debt%20Transparency.pdf (last 
accessed 12 July 2021). 
20 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th ed. (Washington DC: IMF, 2007) ch.5 
‘Classification: Financial Instruments,’ 59. 
21 The OECD DAC Statistics definition. 
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Private Finance Party (PFP) means any person acting as lender, arranger or agent which is 
neither a state nor MLA. 
Bank-to-State CFA means any CFA whereby one or more PFP agrees to provide credit 
facilities to a state, or organ of a state, for consideration (usually fees and margin). 
Bank-to-State debt means debt incurred under a Bank-to-State CFA. 
These definitions are terse and do require some familiarity with the jargon. The definition of Bank-to-
State CFA is designed to capture bilateral and multilateral credit agreements under which banks, 
normally, agree to make credit available to a state. The state may then choose to draw down this credit, 
usually in a prescribed manner. In our case the majority of such facilities for which there is information 
are stated to be on a ‘term’ basis, that is, the borrower is expected to repay the loan according to a fixed 
amortisation schedule. Such agreements have a relatively standard form, even if the governing law 
differs. This standard is the so-called London form of credit facilities agreement as promulgated by the 
Loan Market Association.  
The definition of Bank-to-State CFA is non-exclusive in that it captures any CFA to which a PFP 
is a party even if a non-PFP – a state or MLA – is also a party. The reason for this is that when states 
and MLAs do enter into agreements as part of a syndicate with PFPs, it is usual that CFAs still reflect 
the legal substance of the CFAs that interest us. It is also common, however, for PFPs and MLAs to 
provide funding under separate CFAs, their respective rights being dealt with by intercreditor 
agreement. 
2.  Method and empirical methodology  
The data concerning Bank-to-State CFAs was collated on 11 October 2018 (the first reference date or 
‘1RD’) and rerun on 10 November 2019 (the second reference date or ‘2RD’) and all data stated to be 
my own are drawn from this one dataset, crosschecking with available data from Jubilee Debt 
Campaign.22 The data were sourced from a standard Bloomberg terminal and are not compared with 
data sourced from Bloomberg’s chief competitor ThomsonReuters Datastream. The principal reason 
for this is that Datastream does not provide the granularity required to isolate Bank-to-State CFAs, 
being rather focused on fixed income debt (commonly known as bonds). 
As to Bloomberg, a LSRC loan search was applied to all active loans, ranging over deals and 
tranches. These were filtered using the BICS Classification for Sovereigns, within this selecting the 
subsets: governments, local government, regions and government agencies. This excluded lending to 
central banks and other public financial institutions. The African data were filtered by country of risk 
‘all Africa’,23 which limited the obligors, including guarantors, to that continent. They were further 
filtered: (i) restricting to date of loan signing: 1 September 2008 to 31 August 2018; (ii) restricting to 
structure type: bilateral or (part-) syndicated; (iii) excluding public finance parties-only deals, which 
was done by manually filtering states and each relevant MLA. 
The search garnered 234 results which provided the following information where known: (i) 
parties; (ii) dates of signing and maturity; (iii) total commitments (amounts capable of being borrowed) 
and total outstanding; (iv) guarantor; (v) loan type. 
The data were restricted in time and space for the following reasons: 
(i) The credit crunch of 2008 is a marked macroeconomic event, particularly in the financial 
sphere. In the short to medium term it offers, if not a ‘year zero’, at least a point in time 
 
22 https://jubileedebt.org.uk/countries (last accessed 13 July 2021). 
23 As defined by Bloomberg’s ‘Countries & Regions’ tool. 
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when finance retreated, and policymakers began their attempts to reconfigure financial 
regulation. 
(ii) All Africa has been chosen as the initial lead on this research arose from a deal between 
European banks and an African state. The analysis could be readily extended to all 
emerging markets for which data are available. 
The data are subject to the following caveats: 
(i) Unlike bonds, CFAs such as Bank-to-State CFAs are not subject to any generalised 
disclosure requirement. The data therefore represent what either states or PFPs have 
disclosed voluntarily. In the case of states ‘voluntarily’ means either disclosure mandated 
by the state’s own law, or disclosure otherwise by government action. PFPs are deemed to 
have disclosed to the financial press or data services voluntarily. 
(ii) The data are not raw but subject to classification, permitting my search. Errors in 
classification therefore cannot be discounted, particularly in cases where an MLA may have 
acted as arranger, but the lenders were PFPs. This should have not been excluded by the 
search, but the lenders may have been ignored by the classifier or not disclosed. 
(iii) The data indicated a handful of deals where PFP lenders were sub-participants. Legally 
speaking they are not parties to a Bank-to-State CFA, but to a back-to-back arrangement 
with a nominal lender under the Bank-to-State CFA and indirectly exercise many rights 
under the Bank-to-State CFA. It may be the case that synthetic structures such as this were 
included. 
(iv) Both active and matured deals were searched, though the results did not differ. This seems 
improbable, and perhaps matured deals were not picked up by the search. 
The data were then subjected to a largely first order statistical analysis, which revealed the 
following evidence of note. This evidence will be used to bolster the wider critical doctrinal 
methodology applied to the case for reform around Bank-to-State CFAs. 
3.  Growth in Bank-to-State Debt 
If we look at figure 1 we see a growth trend from Q3 2008 to date, this being roughly approximated by 
the linear trendline shown.  
Figure 1: Total Bank-to-State Debt per Year all Africa 2008-2018 
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We observe that these deals are somewhat cyclical, tending to occur in bunches biannually. The 
12 largest deals, constituting commitments greater than or equal to USD20bn, severally involved Egypt, 
Mali, and Cameroon. The lenders were: 
Table 1: 12 largest deals 2008-2018 grouped by state and lenders 
Country of risk Lenders 
Mali BNP Paribas, Banco de Unaio, Banque du 
Developpement de Mali, local banks 
Egypt Bank of Cairo, National Bank of Egypt, Islamic 
Development Bank, various Islamic finance 
funds, local development funds 
Cameroon Export-Import Bank of China, Federal Republic 
of Germany  
 
As we are primarily interested in the behaviour of the parties to Bank-to-State CFAs it is most 
interesting to see who amongst those reporting these deals is most involved in the subsector. 71 different 
banking groups were found to have signed Bank-to-State CFAs during the reference period. By this is 
meant that financial institutions may have signed agreements in various capacities and that it is not 
uncommon for different members of a banking corporate group to play these roles. For example, a 
secured loan will require a security agent, and where the security is subject to German law, for example, 
it is not uncommon for the security agent to be a separate legal person incorporated under German or 
Luxembourg law. Deutsche Bank, London Branch may act as lender and facility agent, while Deutsche 
Bank Luxembourg S.A. will act as security agent. These group entities have been counted as a single 
economic unit for the purposes of this analysis. Many such groups engaged in one or two deals during 
the reference period. Table 2 shows those 21 groups which signed three or more deals during the 
reference period. 















































































Total USD Bank-to-State Debt per Year of signing all Africa 
2008-2018
Total
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Bank No. of deals 
Undisclosed24 14 
EXIM Bank of India25 14 
Standard Chartered 10 
Caixa Bank 7 
National Bank of Egypt 6 
Arab-Africa Int. Bank 6 
Citigroup 6 
Société Générale 6 
Deutsche Bank  6 
BNP Paribas 5 
Bank of Cairo 5 
Bank of China Ltd 5 
Rand Merchant Bank 5 
Export-Import Bank of China 4 
Standard Bank of S.Africa 4 
Banque Misr 3 
BMCE Bank 3 
Unicredit  3 
African Export-Import Bank 3 
Banco Bilbao 3 
Banco Santander 3 
Bankia 3 
 
As one can see, even where data have been collected, a number of deals took the option of not 
disclosing some or all of the lenders. In the instances considered there was no pattern to non-disclosure: 
sometimes the disclosed arranger was an MLA; sometimes some private banks were not disclosed. 
Unsurprisingly we find the UK’s Standard Chartered as the leading ‘pure’ private bank in the 
sector. Standard Chartered has a long history of lending in territories of the former British Empire. In 
similar vein we find French banks lending in Francophone and North Africa, while Germany has 
developed links with Cameroon. MENA banks feature heavily, though their lending is concentrated in 
Egypt in the sample. Chinese and Indian finance also predominates, though interestingly Chinese banks 
are the primary vehicle for credit, whereas Indian finance comes largely from one source: EXIM Bank 
of India. 
A related factor for consideration is not the headquarters of a given bank, but the branch at 
which a Bank-to-State CFA was signed. This information was not provided in the majority of cases, but 
where it was we found that many banks operated through their Johannesburg branch, or through 
London. The lack of data makes it difficult to draw conclusions on a preference for branch accounting 
purposes. One should note that where Bank-to-State CFAs are signed in these branch jurisdictions one 
would expect the choice of governing law to be English law. This is because an investment grade CFA 
 
24 Indicated either as undisclosed or by the tag ‘FULLE’ which stands for ‘Full Lender list undisclosed’. 
25 EXIM Bank of India is effectively a public-private partnership of the Indian state and private banks. 
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is expected to be English law governed, whereas so-called ‘South African Agreements’ are a deviation 
from the norm and are governed by local law.26 
If we analyse the data by number of deals in a given year irrspective of value, a different picture 
emerges: the number of deals tends to fall over the decade even as total amounts increase. Figure 2 
shows this: 
Figure 2: Number of Bank-to-State CFA deals with African states by Year 2008-2018 
 
What we see is an inverse trend: the number of discrete deals falls even as the value of these 
deals increases. Of particular note is the fall in deals and deal value in 2013. The reasons for this are 
not immediately obvious, but there are at least three macroeconomic factors which may have played a 
part. Firstly, on the supply side Spring 2012 broadly marks the end of the deepest point of the Eurozone 
crisis, when various measures had been put in place to shore up Southern European banks and 
restructure Greek debt. Plausibly, this hangover from the 2008 crisis reduced the willingness of 
European banks to lend, especially in Emerging Markets. Secondly, 2013 marked a major tour of Africa 
by President of the United States Barack Obama at which he announced a large aid programme to fund 
infrastructure. These funds may well have crowded out private debt that could have funded those 
projects. Thirdly, 2013 also marks the end of a period of African debt relief under the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries scheme where mainly Paris Club creditors, but also some private creditors, provided a 
degree of debt relief. This scheme, which was largely focused on Africa, may have instigated a period 
of fiscal retrenchment under which financial indebtedness was constrained through to the end of 2013 
before new rounds of borrowing, based on an improved debt-to-GDP ratio, began in 2014. Yet as we 
shall see when comparing Bank-to-State CFAs with all kinds of debt, all debt continued to increase in 
 
26 Slaughter & May LLP, LMA Loan Documentation in Africa, September 2018, at 
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2013. This is perhaps due to alternative forms of sovereign borrowing, such as Bank-to-State CFAs, 
bearing the brunt of reduced activity. 
4.  Lending concentration by state 
Which states are contracting for Bank-to-State Debt? Using country of risk as the determinant, the data 
can be mapped in the following intensity chart (crosshatched states lack data). 
Figure 3: Bilateral and Syndicated Debt by Amount and State 2008-2018 
  
 
One notices three zones of concentration: (i) Francophone Africa; (ii) Tanzania and Uganda; 
(iii) variously South Africa and Egypt. South Africa and Egypt can be separately explained by the nature 
of their economies and the involvement of state and credit agencies in large projects in these states. 
High levels of Bank-to-State Debt should not be surprising for these states. The case of Francophone 
Africa is explained by the continued role of France in the affairs of these countries combined with 
France’s dirigiste model of corporate governance. That is, French banks, like other major French 
corporates, are more likely to be involved in lending that would be undertaken by public bodies of other 
states such as the UK. However, while the data shows the significant presence of French banks in Mali 
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and Côte d’Ivoire, Bank-to-State Debt is also provided to a large extent by MENA banks to Niger, and 
German state-backed finance houses to Cameroon. 
What about Tanzania and Uganda? Surprisingly perhaps this concentration of Bank-to-State 
Debt is due to Japanese banks. TanzaniaInvest reports27 strong ties between these countries. Exports 
from Japan to Tanzania has grown by 275 percent in 10 years (2004 to 2014), amounting to 
approximately USD266.7m in 2014. Similary, exports from Tanzania to Japan attained growth of 193 
percent in the same period, amounting to approximately USD210m in 2014. The Ugandan investments 
appear to be linked to the use of Japanese banking corporations (as well as state bodies) to fund oil and 
gas projects there and in East Africa generally. This is driven by an internal assessment by Japan of its 
energy needs following the Fukushima disaster.28 
5.  Sources of lending – London and London branches 
Finally, the data hint at the role of London as the locus for bank branches involved with Bank-to-State 
CFAs. To emphasise, our concern is with the current state of English law in its treatment of ultra vires 
state contracts and questions of agency are governed by the law of the contract (English law), with 
London also likely to be the exclusive forum. Although data were sought on the governing law of Bank-
to-State CFAs, insufficient data were forthcoming. This article therefore assumes a correlation between 
English law governed Bank-to-State CFAs and Bank-to-State CFAs to which UK banks or non-UK 
banks acting through London branches are a party. Indeed, as with the case of Johannesburg branches, 
one expects many more Bank-to-State CFAs to be governed by English law than just these London-
originated deals. 
Of the 235 deals analysed, 13 separate deals were found involving UK banks without a 
qualification as to a non-UK branch (Barclays, HSBC, and Standard Chartered) and 14 more which 
stated that the following banks (Table 3) operated from their London branches. The data on this issue 
suffers from three problems. Firstly, the data were gathered pre-Brexit and so the EU law on company 
branches was in force. This allows a company incorporated in an EU Member State to establish a branch 
in any other Member State for accounting purposes.29 The data do not capture whether a given non-UK 
bank is using a separate legal entity in the UK to lend – though FBN Bank UK Ltd may be such a case. 
Secondly, the data are highly reliant on the correct recording of branch information, if this has occurred 
at all. Thirdly the data include 14 deals involving undisclosed lists of lenders who may be UK based. 
Table 3: Lender London branches involved in Bank-to-State CFAs to Africa 2008-2018 
Bank branch Country of HQ Instances 
Citibank NA, London Branch NY, USA 2 
Credit Suisse SA, London Branch Switzerland 1 
FBN Bank UK Ltd Nigeria 3 
FirstRand Bank Ltd, London Branch S. Africa 1 
ING Bank, London Branch Netherlands 1 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA, London Branch Italy 4 
Rand Merchant Bank, London Branch S. Africa 2 
Total instances 14 
Total Bank-to-State CFAs from bank’s London branches USD 4,295,000,000 
 
27 https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/japan (last accessed 9 July 2021). 
28 The World Folio, ‘Japan looks to grow its presence across Africa’ (2016) 
http://www.theworldfolio.com/news/japan-looks-to-grow-its-presence-across-africa/4264/ (last accessed 9 July 
2021). 
29 See further the Eleventh Company Law Directive 89/666/EEC, on disclosure requirements in respect of 
branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another State. 
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 Comparison with wider movements in sovereign debt 
Returning to Figure 1, overall the aggregate value of these deals expands over the decade to date. What 
does this expansion mean in the context of all African debt? Drawing on statistics from the Bank for 
International Settlements, Figure 4 charts the total debt lent to all Emerging Markets (Africa not being 
specifically differentiated in the BIS data) for the period.  
Figure 4: Total Debt of all kinds to EM states and state bodies 2008-201830 
 
The number of states, and level and instruments of indebtedness are significantly greater in this 
instance, providing robustness to the positive growth indicated by the trendline. Given that the figure is 
cumulative, of most interest is the increasing trend for all debt which manifests growth (some 
USD2.2bn/year) of all debt over the period. The much looser fitting trend for Bank-to-State CFAs shows 
a smaller increase over the decade, being of a different scale (approximately USD214m/year). Thus, we 
only draw the simplest conclusion: that the growth in Bank-to-State CFAs into Africa increased at the 
same time that all debt increased into Emerging Markets, though the growth in Bank-to-State CFAs 
was intermittent, with bigger biannual leaps compensating for quieter intermediate periods. On this 
basis Bank-to-State CFAs do not seem to replace more traditional sovereign debt finance (bonds and 
MLA debt). Rather it appears that this form of financing, characteristic of corporates, is expanding to 
meet ‘demand’ for alternative forms of credit and potentially alternative ‘corporate scale’ credit 
purposes as markets are developed. In other words, there are only so many ‘big ticket’ infrastructure 
projects that can be built. 
That is the general trend for all external debt, but can we find a more specific comparator? The 
International Debt Statistics of the World Bank provide such finely categorised data, though not fine 
enough to identify Bank-to-State Debt. Here we identified the debt disbursed and outstanding made 
available by external private creditors (principally financial institutions such as banks) to governments, 
aggregated on an annualised basis.31 In other words we are observing at each data point the aggregate 
amounts of debt drawn down by sovereigns and the amounts to be repaid, noting that if an amount is 
 
30 Source data: Bank for International Settlements: BIS Statistics Explorer: Credit to the non‑financial sector: F5.5 
Total credit to the government sector (core debt) – at nominal value, USD billions (Updated: 19/09/2018 08:50). 
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outstanding for a period greater than 12 months then it will be counted twice, once on each reference 
date falling within that period. The states chosen were those of sub-Saharan Africa. Data were available 
for 44 such states, the most notable omission being the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
Figure 5: Total Government Debt Disbursed and Outstanding, owed to Private Creditors to Sub-
Saharan Africa by state 2008-2019 
 
Figure 5 shows faster growth than that for the Bank-to-State Debt (see Figure 2). A similar 
visualisation of the composition of these values by state over time is unhelpful, but the data do provide 
insights. South Africa is the leading debtor of the 44 states, being subject to private debt of almost six 
times that of the next most indebted sub-Saharan state, with USD73bn in 2017 falling to USD68bn in 
2018 – some 49 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s private creditor debt burden. Amongst the remaining 
sub-Saharan states with data for the time period, there are nine such states with disbursements and 
outstandings in excess of USD2bn as at 31 December 2018, accounting for roughly 42 percent of the 
total for Sub-Saharan Africa. These states manifest the greatest movements in indebtedness, as figure 6 
shows: 
Figure 6 Total Government Debt Disbursed and Outstanding >USD2bn as at y/e 31/12/2018, owed 
to Private Creditors to Sub-Saharan Africa by state 2008-2019 (Excl. S.Africa) 
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These absolute trends must also be relativised to the GDP of the individual states if we are to 
obtain a full picture. Figure 7 is a heat map of private creditor disbursements and outstandings in 2018 
per state, as a percentage of GDP.32 
Figure 7: Private creditor disbursements and outstandings to Sub-Saharan African states in 2018, 
as a percentage of 2018 GDP 
 
32 IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2019. 
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While Cabo Verde is an outlier with private debt-to-GDP of 25 percent, six African states have 
the dubious honour of owing between 10 and 20 percent of their GDP to private creditors: in descending 
order Zambia, (19.8 percent), South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Sudan, and Angola (10.6 
percent). 
Mozambique (the beginning point of this research), though its borrowings from private 
creditors are in the hundreds of millions, not billions, has not bucked this trend. While its private debt 
to GDP ratio is some 5.0 percent,33 the trend of increasing private debt in absolute terms has followed 
that of the major Sub-Saharan debtor states. In 2008 Government Debt (Disbursement and Outstanding) 
was USD7.2m, rising quickly to USD26m by end-2011 and exceeding USD412m by mid-2018. To put 
these pre-2019 figures in context, in 2020 Credit Suisse demanded34 that Mozambique repay USD622m 
in respect of the now restructured Finance Agreements – an amount 150 percent bigger than the total 
disbursements and outstandings of 2019, and indeed 4.3 percent of Mozambique’s 2018 GDP. 
 Drawing conclusions from the data 
These data establish a general trend of increasing sub-Saharan sovereign indebtedness to private 
creditors, providing context for the underlying growth in Bank-to-State CFAs established. While the 
identified Bank-to-State CFAs constitute only 2.8 percent of the total private creditor debt to 
governments, when we consider these amounts on a state-by-state basis we observe cases for concern, 
such as those of Mozambique, Angola and Cabo Verde. The growth in Bank-to-State CFAs forms part 
 
33 As of 2018: International Development Association, International Monetary Fund, Republic of Mozambique: 
Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis, April 2020, 3. The raw data show 2.87 percent, but 
Mozambique has subsequently rebased its GDP and so the DSA’s figure from 2020 for 2018 is used. 
34 Reuters Staff, ‘Credit Suisse says Mozambique liable for $622 million loan at heart of bribery scandal’ (22 
January 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-credit-suisse-idUKKBN1ZL1Q4 (last accessed 
13 July 2021).  
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of this generalised growth in private debt, but existing World Bank statistics do not have the granularity 
permitting us to identify the legal nature of the private creditor-originated indebtedness disbursed and 
outstanding. It has therefore proved necessary to glean such data as we can from other financial sources. 
These data are inherently incomplete because of the voluntary nature of reporting and the general 
confidentiality of Bank-to-State CFAs – a confidentiality which this article claims aids fraudulent loan-
making.  
 This article argues that the empirical data set against just this lack of transparency motivate 
consideration of whether the English law of state liability for Bank-to-State CFAs should be reformed 
to increase transparency. Our particular focus will the legal principles encapsulated in UNCTAD 
Principle 3: the law relating to agency and authorisation of state officials. We have already noted Anna 
Gelpern’s counsel that these UNCTAD Principles should support but also be fleshed out in particular 
initiatives, including due diligence and legislative reforms in individual jurisdictions. If the numbers of 
Bank-to-State CFAs from banks’ London branches continues to increase, and increasingly burden 
states, then the opportunities for fraud – fraud relying on what this article argues is the currently 
antiquated stance of English law – will only increase. When we consider that the cases of Mozambique 
(and as we shall see, Ukraine) demonstrate the stresses placed on the law of want and abuse of official 
authority and creditor knowledge, one would expect that we will also see an increasing number of cases 
before the High Court or arbitral tribunals in which the spotlight is thrown on City of London banking 
practices operating in the creditor-friendly shadow of English law. Therefore, in Part III this article asks 
whether English law unwittingly favours corrupt transactions involving Bank-to-State CFAs by placing 
the greater part of the risk of corruption on the side of states. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
As LJ Garay Salamanca has shown,35 Bank-to-State CFAs are hardly new, having developed in the 
Eurodollar market in the late 1960s, before taking off in the late 1970s, particularly as more actors 
entered the market. Thus: 
Gradually, the criteria for credit extension as well as the borrowers’ objectives deemed eligible for 
financing became more flexible, and more financing was granted to the public sector. … In the Latin 
American case, the public sector share in the stock of medium- and long-term external commercial bank 
debt increased from 53 percent to 58 percent between 1975 and 1981, while the share of commercial 
bank debt increased from 49 percent to 65 percent of the total stock of medium- and long-term external 
government debt. Meanwhile, the share of short-term debt in the total commercial debt balance increased 
from 21 percent to 28 percent during this period (IDB, 1984).36 
The consequences of defaulting on these loans are well-known. States languish in a pre-insolvency law 
realm in which sovereign pseudo-bankruptcies descend into a creditor free-for-all. Nor need this article 
rehearse the many instances of (un)successful work out, the calls for some kind of international 
insolvency regime perhaps modelled on the US Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 9,37 or the ad hoc efforts of 
stakeholders to ameliorate this situation, for example through recommendations on the adoption of 
 
35 Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca, ‘The 1980s Crisis in Syndicated Bank Lending to Sovereigns and the Sequence 
of Mechanisms to Fix it’ in Barry Herman, et al. (eds.) Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010), 111-139. 
36 Garay Salamanca, 113.  
37 Anne Krueger, ‘International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring,’ IMF Discussion Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2001); Barry Eichengreen, 
Towards a New International Financial Architecture (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1999); 
Kunibert Raffer, ‘Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with 
Human Face,’ 18 World Development 301–11 (1990). 
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Collective Action Clauses,38 or the HIPC programme.39 Our concern, however, is not the endgame of 
indebtedness but rather the moment of creation of the indebtedness; a moment in which debts may be 
incurred in a questionable manner. 
Our particular concern is just those situations where one or more banks lends to a state on the 
basis of a credit facilities agreement governed, for the sake of this article’s argument, by English law 
(though the discussion is generalisable to other common law systems which follows English agency 
law, such as Singapore and Malaysia). As noted above, the UNCTAD Principle 3 promotes the idea 
creditors have responsibility to determine whether a creditor has been authorised, but this responsibility 
is not reflected in English law. First, the state must act through its officials and, as in the case of the 
Mozambique loans scandal, those officials may be acting for some alleged ulterior motive in binding 
the state to a credit facilities agreement. As a matter of applicable law, will the state be bound to such a 
contract? Excluded from this analysis are cases identified by Jeff King40 where the contract is contrary 
to public policy or otherwise for an unlawful purpose – there may well be fraud in cases such as the 
Tuna Bond Scandal but the fraud in such cases uses the lawfulness of a contract as a façade.  
The basic principle, from which our analysis follows, is that as a matter of English law a foreign 
state which enters into a private English law agreement with a private entity is regarded as acting 
analogously to a corporation.41 Indeed, ‘the case of a foreign government is the same as that of a 
corporation, and the ordinary practice applicable to a corporation must be adapted, as well as it would 
admit….’42 In what remains the leading international law analysis of state’s liability for contracts and 
their right of repudiation, Theodor Meron43 finds that in the municipal laws that he has examined, states 
are either explicitly regarded as corporations, or implicitly so in that the analysis of authority that 
follows assumes an equivalency. English law appears to adopt the implicit approach, which the Court 
of Appeal quoted in Law Debenture Trust Corporation v Ukraine (2018):44 
In conclusion, it appears that although analogies with corporations might usefully be drawn in particular 
respects, a foreign State in English law is not a foreign corporation, or an English corporation, either sole 
or aggregate, or a "quasi-corporation", or even an English legal person of whatever kind. 
The Court of Appeal qualified this formulation:45 Ukraine was present for the purposes of private 
rights in England because of recognition by the Crown, acting through HM Government. The 
recognition conferred legal personality (though not a personhood constituted ex nihilo by English law 
or foreign law), and the cases were clear that this personality was its own and not the same as that of 
individual state officials. Further, some analogy could be drawn with international organisations which 
are explicitly regarded as corporations.46 In any event, it was enough to observe that having legal 
personality, a foreign state had the power to make contracts and to authorise agents to make them on its 
behalf.  
The finding that a state has a capacity analogous to a corporation leads us to the follow analytical 
questions: (a) can a state only act in furtherance of its objects? (b) may a state only act by deploying its 
powers? (c) how does a state, being a legal person, act through its duly authorised agents (directly or 
indirectly, natural persons)? Questions (a) and (b) are usually regarded as part of the ultra vires rule and 
 
38 Nancy P. Jacklin, ‘Addressing Collective-Action Problems in Securitized Credit’ 74(3) Law & Contemporary 
Problems 175-192. 
39 Guder, Debt Relief, n 11. 
40 Jeff King, Odious Debt, n 7, 146-153. 
41 Prioleau v United States and Johnson (1866) LR 2 Eq. 659 (CA). 
42 Per Hall VC in Peru v Wegelin (1875) LR 20 Eq. 140 (CA), at 141-2. 
43 Meron (1957) 289. 
44 [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, hereafter LDTC v Ukraine, quoting Geoffrey Marston, ‘The Personality of the Foreign 
State in English Law’ 56(2) Cambridge Law Journal 374-417 (1997), at [63]. 
45 LDTC v Ukraine at [55]-[75]. 
46 S.1(2)(a) International Organisations Act 1968. 
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should be considered first in any legal analysis. Question (c) initiates a secondary consideration of the 
rules of agency which tie directly back to UNCTAD Principle 3. 
 Ultra vires 
On the above assumptions, the Court of Appeal in LDTC v Ukraine,47 regarded the application of the 
doctrine of ultra vires as fairly straightforward: 
English law imposes no restrictions on the capacity of those who have legal personality under English 
law, so as to render any act by them ultra vires and void…. There is no prerogative or statutory authority 
for limiting the capacity and powers enjoyed by a foreign state, which has legal personality in English 
law by virtue of its recognition as such by HMG. It follows from the absence of any limits at common 
law that as a matter of English law the foreign state enjoys unlimited capacity. Where it enters into a 
contract governed by English law, a foreign state will not therefore lack capacity to make and perform 
the contract, irrespective of the provisions of its own domestic constitution and laws.48 
Thus, ‘recognised foreign states have unlimited capacity (objects and powers) to contract and dispose 
of their assets notwithstanding any restrictions there might be in their constitutions.’49 That a local law 
or constitution purport to limit a state’s capacity and so render an ultra vires contract void (as in LDTC 
v Ukraine) was beside the point – English common law followed public international law in regarding 
a state as labouring under no such restriction and so the contract was valid. 
 Authority 
We therefore turn to the third question: whether the purported agent of the state has due authority to 
bind the state to the credit facilities agreement in question. As far as English courts are concerned50 this 
is a matter of the English law of agency as it pertains to contracts.  
The first principle is that it is the state that has the power to do some act, and that an agent can 
only do that act if that power is donated to it.51 The second principle, to which this article shall return, 
is that where an agent is the donee of a power they must use that power to pursue the objects of the 
donor and not for an improper purpose. Upon these two pillars is erected the following structure: an 
agent may have actual express, actual implied, or ostensible authority to bind the state. In short, actual 
authority is where the agent has expressly been donated a power to some specific act, or more commonly 
has been appointed to some office or other role which implies that they have authority to carry out a 
range of acts.52 Thus as the law stands (and local legal opinions will confirm), a finance minister 
implicitly has authority to sign off on a bond issuance just by virtue of being finance minister, but this 
is less likely to be the case for a junior undersecretary for sports affairs.53 Up to 2006, ostensible 
authority arose fairly often in the domestic courts because they dealt with cases where a third party was 
led to believe that a person was an agent of a corporation. Lord Diplock settled the rules for determining 
whether the corporation were bound, namely that: (i) there be a representation to a third party by a 
principal that the agent has authority; (ii) the principal itself have the power to make such representation; 
 
47 [2018] EWCA Civ 2026. The Supreme Court is due to hand down judgment on the appeal later in 2021. 
48 Ibid. at [71]. 
49 The editors of Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (22nd edn.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) at 2-011, citing 
LDTC v Ukraine. 
50 And Buchheit & Gulati confirm a similar approach in New York: Lee C. Buchheit & G Mitu Gulati & Robert 
B Thompson. ‘The Dilemma of Odious Debts’ (2007) 56 Duke Law Journal 1201-1262, especially 1238ff. 
51 AG for Ceylon v Silva [1953] A.C. 461 at 479; Bowstead & Reynolds, 8-042. 
52 See e.g. Hely-Hutchison v Brayhead [1967] 1 QB 549 obiter. 
53 Marubeni Hong Kong & South China Ltd v Government of Mongolia [2004] EWHC 472 (Comm); [2004] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 198; Donegal International Ltd v Republic of Zambia [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm). 
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(iii) the third party be induced to contract (iv) the corporation’s constitution permits the contract. It is 
enough that those with actual authority acquiesce where the agent purports to act.54  
Nevertheless, arguments as to want of authority have proved to be a battleground in cases 
involving states.55 We need look no further than LDTC v Ukraine,56 where Ukraine’s argument was that 
the Finance Minister who executed a trust deed constituting notes to be issued to the Russian Federation 
lacked authority due to internal borrowing limits. The Court of Appeal held in 2018 that either the 
Finance Minister had usual (sc. actual implied) authority or failing that that he had ostensible authority 
unless LDTC knew or ought to have known that the Finance Minister was exceeding these internal 
borrowing limits. The CA determined that LDTC did not and could not be expected to have such 
knowledge (even Ukraine was initially unaware of the limit breach).57  
If the Supreme Court confirms the existing view that state finance officials possess actual implied 
authority to bind the state to credit facilities agreements (unless the third party has notice of an actual 
internal restriction on that authority), then – in cases such as the Tuna Bond Scandal where deceit is in 
issue – much of the weight of argument will fall not on whether an agent had authority to exercise a 
state power, but on whether they exercised it for an improper purpose. This appears to be a 
straightforward question, but because the improper purpose may be bound up with some fraud, the case 
law is difficult. This is because a third party dealing with a ‘corporation’ can be expected to know the 
powers of that ‘corporation’ given the public nature of its constitution, but it can hardly be required to 
investigate whether the internal procedures of the ‘corporation’ have been followed such that an agent, 
actually having the power to do some act, is acting for its principal’s benefit and not for an improper 
purpose. Rather, the third party is entitled to assume, absent notice, that the internal management of the 
company is sound: the so-called rule in Turquand58 extended to states in Donegal International Ltd v 
Zambia.59 
Following the courts’ analogy, the leading English corporations law case is Rolled Steel Products 
Ltd v British Steel,60 where RSP’s director (a Mr Shenkman) signed a guarantee in favour of SSS Ltd, 
in which he was personally interested. RSP had the general power to guarantee, but this guarantee in no 
way benefited RSP; rather it benefited Mr Shenkman personally via SSS Ltd. All parties knew of this 
abuse. It was held that: (i) the act was intra vires; (ii) the power was not used to further the company’s 
objects; (iii) SSS Ltd, being the ‘creature’ of Mr Shenkman, had actual knowledge of the fraud; and (iv) 
having such knowledge, SSS Ltd could not rely on the rule in Turquand. The Rolled Steel approach can 
also be used to explain the decision in Hopkins v TL Dallas Group Ltd61 in which a deputy managing 
director fraudulent signed highly disadvantageous letters in his favour and to the knowledge of the 
counterparty.  
An initial reaction62 to the Mozambique scandal followed Rolled Steel, or at the very least 
analogised from the basic contract law principles that a fraud between agent and third party does not 
bind a principal. The problem with this ‘gut reactions’ was that it ignored a rather central distinction 
between Rolled Steel and the Mozambique scenario, at least as initially reported. Remember, at the time 
it was not known that Credit Suisse employees had been involved in bribery, and these same employees 
continue to deny that they knew of any conspiracy directed at the Republic. In Rolled Steel the third-
 
54 See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480. 
55 See cases n 53. Cf. J.E. Verreault et Fils Ltée v AG for Quebec [1977] 1 S.C.R. 41. 
56 [2018] EWCA Civ 2026. 
57 Ibid. [125]. 
58 Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327. 
59 [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm), cited in LDTC v Ukraine at [110]. 
60 [1986] Ch 246. 
61 [2004] EWHC 1379 (Ch). 
62 Matthew Hill, ‘Mozambique Bribe Claims Could Void Debts, Law Professor [Mitu Gulati] Says’ (Bloomberg, 
7 January 2019).  
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party beneficiary, SSS Ltd, was a co-conspirator with the agent director. That is why the third party 
could not rely on Turquand: it knew or was deemed to know that the agent director was abusing his 
power. In the Mozambique scandal, on the facts as we understood them in late 2018, the banks did not 
know that the state officials were abusing their power. As such, Rolled Steel says that the banks could 
by analogy rely on the Turquand Rule, and that they could assume that the agent, having actual implied 
authority, had been internally authorised to sign the Finance Agreements. The agreements were binding 
on Mozambique, and if the officials had breached fiduciary duties to their principal, Mozambique’s 
claim was against these officials and not the banks.  
 Consequences and policy implications  
Let us now summarise our results. Ultra vires is inapplicable to a foreign state; it has unlimited capacity 
to enter into a contract such as a Bank-to-State CFA under English law. Where the validity of the 
contract is called into question due to want of authority of an actual or purported agent of the state, then 
on a finding of lack of authority the contract is voidable – the state may elect to affirm the contract or 
treat it as void. If an agent has authority but the third party knows that the agent is abusing that authority 
for an improper purpose, the contract will be voidable. If the third party has no notice of the abuse, they 
are entitled to assume the agent’s actions are approved by the state and the contract is enforceable.  
The voiding of a disbursed Bank-to-State CFA can be disastrous for a bank: evidently the 
property (money) has gone somewhere and the bank may be out of pocket several million USD. If a 
contract procured by fraud against the principal is upheld and is enforceable, it is the state that bears 
this loss; it is of less concern to the bank who must repay the loan, for the bank has performed its side 
of the bargain and is entitled to delivery of the specified sums in repayment by the named obligor. 
The consequences of the current state of the law for a country such as Mozambique appear to be 
this. Mozambique has unlimited objects and capacity to enter into loan contracts. Depending on their 
status, an official of Mozambique has implied actual authority to bind Mozambique to Bank-to-State 
CFAs, and may have ostensible authority in certain circumstances. In the absence of actual notice that 
an official is abusing their power to bind Mozambique to a CFA, a foreign party is entitled (pace the 
UNCTAD Principles) to assume that the official is authorised to bind Mozambique. The Bank-to-State 
CFA is therefore valid, and Mozambique has only an ‘internal’ claim against its official. 
Buchheit et al. neatly set out the policy question that is put in issue in the context of New York law: 
The sovereign debt context raises a typical concern of agency law – that of faithless agents who purport 
to bind principals to an obligation to third parties when the fruits received in return for the obligation 
only accrue to the agents. Who, as between the principal (country and citizens) and the third party (the 
lender) should bear this risk of the faithless agent?63 
As we have seen, UNCTAD Principle 3 places responsibility on creditors to verify authority, but we 
have established that English law disagrees with that view. Likewise, Buchheit et al. affirm that as in 
England, the risk under New York Law ‘usually lies at the feet of the principal’ for reasons that reflect 
‘both business expediency and some element of efficient risk bearing’ – factors which we have seen 
also informed the English law approach to corporations and agency since Turquand, and indeed the 
international arbitral awards identified by Meron. Yet whereas it seems that English law will only 
overturn the presumption that a third party may assume internal management is sound if the third party 
has actual knowledge of some fraud, Buchheit at al. inform us64 that the New York cases are more 
forgiving. So, for example, if objectively a guaranty is of no corporate benefit to the guarantor 
corporation, then a third party is put on notice and should carry out further due diligence to establish 
 
63 Buchheit et al., ‘Odious Debts’, n 50, 1240.  
64 Ibid. 
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why such an otherwise inherently ultra vires act is being undertaken.65 Likewise, a third-party 
beneficiary of a guaranty cannot rely on a representation by a vice-president and treasurer of a corporate 
guarantor as to an their authority to bind that corporation in the face of visibly suspicious circumstances 
or behaviour.66 
The line English law has drawn is hardly immutable; rather it rests on a weighing of where the 
burden of due diligence and so risk should fall. Even if the view in Turquand is correct, it surely engages 
a balancing of interests materially distinct from our scenario in which state and private party are 
engaged. Indeed, this is the lesson of Meron’s review of the cases: up to his time the trend was towards 
protecting foreign private parties from the sovereign power of state parties by placing the risk of official 
faithlessness on the state. The policy here is plain enough: the state should get its house in order, being 
deemed to be either corrupt or mismanaged such that corruption is prevalent. The whole discourse of 
‘corruption’ is highly problematic and this article does not seek to engage with it. At the other end of 
the spectrum we have the ‘underlying’ English law rule which Turquand sought to mitigate, that a 
corporation registered under the Companies Acts was required by statute to publish its constitution and 
other information and that to give effect to regulation through publication a third party was deemed to 
have notice of constitutional limitations on authority irrespective of whether it was ignorant of them. In 
our case of state and foreign third party, it seems that English law has tended with the international 
cases to move towards protecting the third party. Only if there is actual notice of fraud will the third 
party bear the risk.  
English law’s implicit policy assumptions seem to be that (i) foreign private parties are not in a 
position to monitor the internal bureaucracies of states (cost/benefit calculation), (ii) the power 
imbalance of the relationship means that foreign private parties feel unable to carry out due diligence 
(a pseudo-duress argument), and (iii) the law ought to encourage states to improve their internal 
management to a standard the English court expects (the moralising argument). The Court of Appeal in 
LDTC v Ukraine tacked towards a doctrinal discussion, and there are only hints that the cost/benefit 
calculation may be playing a part. It was tellingly silent on the UNCTAD Principles. The policy 
question must be asked however, and this article claims that the above bases are at least subject to some 
qualification, as the Mozambique scandal shows. Firstly, as to cost/benefit, Mozambique is one of the 
poorest states whereas Credit Suisse is a Global Systemically Important Bank67 whose business is 
assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. Mozambique’s GDP was USD14.396bn in 2018; Credit 
Suisse had annual revenues of USD23.66bn and profits of USD4.94bn in 2019.68 The bank is more 
skilled and economically more capable in carrying out due diligence in the area. Nor would requiring 
due diligence impose an additional burden, for a cursory review of any investment grade loan agreement 
shows the lengths banks go to, through conditions precedent and representations, to establish the 
capacity of obligors and their agents. To hold banks to a lower standard of diligence is to hold them to 
a standard they themselves do not accept. While Credit Suisse’s relative economic size and skill support 
placing it under the greater risk burden, the UNCTAD Principles underscore that all creditors should be 
engaging in responsible lending, and in particular should be checking that appropriate authorisation is 
obtained. 
For its part, an argument from some form of duress remains highly specific to the facts, but the 
general trend of English courts has been to look to actual wrongdoing (such as a deceit or threat of 
breach of contract) as a basis for so drastic a finding. The advantage in this context of seeking an 
identifiable wrong is that this must be preferable to the vague prejudices about southern states which 
 
65 Strip Clean Floor Refinishing v NY Dist. Council No.9, 333 F. Supp. 385, 396 (EDNY 1971). 
66 Gen. Overseas Films, Ltd. V Robin Int’l, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 684, 690 (SDNY 1982). 
67 Financial Stability Board, 2020 G-SIB List available at https://www.fsb.org/2020/11/2020-list-of-global-
systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/ (last accessed 12 July 2021). 
68 Full Year and Q4 Results, 13 February 2020. 
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haunt the older international arbitral awards. If a state has prevented due diligence in some way, let this 
be pleaded out.  
Finally, the moralising argument is outmoded and arguably ineffectual. States such as 
Mozambique lack the resources to enforce strict internal oversight processes. As David Stasavage has 
shown,69 where Mozambique has been able to reduce corruption it has been because of increasing the 
wages of functionaries and reducing the gap between the black market and official exchange rates for 
the metical. Yet, Stasavage continues, this has not been enough: Mozambique cannot afford to employ 
sufficient officials which results in individual officials having wide-ranging economic power and 
discretion. Furthermore, as Tvedten and Picardo confirm, while initial anti-corruption efforts made 
headway in the 1980s, the transition to a market economy led to increasingly complicated forms of 
corruption which the state was simply ill-equipped to investigate despite its best efforts.70 Finally, there 
has been a critical shortage of people skilled to take on official roles, either as civil servants or as 
prosecutors. The most capable are offered much better wages in the private sector or outside 
Mozambique.71 In short, judicial attempts to chastise states such as Mozambique into stamping out 
corruption are misguided and patronising. English law should work to facilitate the diligent work of the 
vast majority of skilled and committed Mozambican officials working to combat corruption. 
Such is the state of the law at present: banks know that the English court places the risk of a corrupt 
state agent upon the state-principal, and that irrespective of the ultimate destination of disbursed funds, 
the bank’s balance sheet will continue to note the liability of a sovereign state as an asset. This article 
has posited policy arguments as to why such a legal settlement is unacceptable, motivated by the 
empirical evidence showing why this apparently niche issue may well become increasingly important, 
and a source of further injustice orchestrated from London’s financial and legal centres of gravity. What 
though, is to be done? 
IV. DEVELOPING REFORM PROPOSALS 
 Introduction 
As Sonja Gibbs has noted, there are ‘significant disclosure gaps in both private sector and official 
bilateral lending to EM sovereigns’ and ‘a lack of transparency [which] contributes to a range of 
problems’.72 Such concerns motivated the UNCTAD Principles and drove the IIF’s 2017 Voluntary 
Principles for Debt Transparency. Both sets of principles are voluntary. My interest here is to discuss 
certain binding legislative options which may concretise these proposals by mandating some form of 
transparency, or achieve that aim by other means. 
Our focus is on Bank-to-State CFAs governed by English law and having English courts as their 
forum, which are made without the knowledge or due authorisation of that state’s proper organs, the 
funds of which may be disbursed for actual purposes which do not benefit that state.  This part evaluates 
legislative, regulatory, and voluntary options whereby the practice of concluding corrupt Bank-to-State 
CFAs could in some way be curtailed, including by means of restricting their enforceability in England 
& Wales. 
 
69 David Stasavage, Causes n 12.  
70 Tvedten & Picardo Goats Eat Where They Are Tied Up n 12, confirming Stasavage, Causes, 79-85.  
71 Stasavage, Causes, n 12, 85-86. 
72 Sonja Gibbs (MD Institute of International Finance), ‘Debt transparency to the rescue? Possibilities and 
Limitations?’ Lecture of 17 November 2019 at UNCTAD’s 12th Debt Management Conference. 
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The options are ordered so that changes which may be easier to implement come first.  It should 
in my view be easier to change regulatory guidance than enact Parliamentary legislation, especially at 
this time. 
 Discussion of options 
In of the following proposals the term Institutions is used. Following UK and EU practice: Institution 
means a credit institution or investment firm as defined in Art.4(1) Capital Requirements Regulation, 
itself ‘Retained EU law’ after Brexit. This includes investment firms because my own research indicates 
notable growth since 2008 in the role of non-banks and shadow banks in providing lending globally.73  
1.  Voluntary or mandatory register of Bank-State CFAs 
Certain Institutions have proposed creating a register of loans to states which could be inspected by the 
public. Entering a transaction onto such a register would be a good ‘safe harbour’ for Institutions 
seeking to escape the deeming provisions discussed in 3 below. This registration process can be 
voluntary or mandatory.  It would be hoped that transparency would be enough to prevent corrupt Bank-
to-State CFAs but there will be a question of what happens if an Institution fails to register a Bank-to-
State CFA. Several other questions arise with respect to such a register, including: 
i. What is the timeframe for registration? Comparable registers tend to admit of registration within 
a short time after a transaction is agreed. Would post hoc registration be acceptable, when it is 
too late? Proposal 3 attempts to solve this. 
ii. How public is public?  Even if the register may be accessed by anyone, how much information 
should be provided?  One could follow US SEC practice and to require a filing of the text of all 
relevant finance documents. 
iii. Who should maintain the register? The UK FCA, which already maintains a register of 
regulated persons, would seem the most appropriate choice. One would expect the cost of 
register maintenance to be borne by registering Institutions who would pay a fee per registration 
reflective of the total commitments of a given Bank-to-State CFA. 
The principal benefit of this proposal would be that, if voluntary, it can easily be established 
without legislative intervention. 
2.  Reporting requirement 
In keeping with recent trends to regulate corporate behaviour (for example, the Modern Slavery Act 
2015 (the MSA2015)), an Institution would be required to engage in internal due diligence regarding 
Bank-to-State CFAs and to report these processes in its annual report, making a statement in its annual 
report that no Bank-to-State CFA have been made in breach of the UNCTAD Principles (or if so, 
explaining how).74  
This kind of reporting requirement tends to be enforced by means of summary criminal sanction 
(a fine or in the most serious cases imprisonment) for Institution officers. This method of regulation 
does not attack the Bank-to-State CFAs themselves, and states will still be liable under the relevant 
agreements. 
 
73 Stephen Connelly, ‘When overseeing becomes overlooking: the post-GFC reconfigurations of international 
finance’ 16(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 403-35 (2016). 
74 I would like to thank Dr Marie Pillon, for her assistance in understanding the MSA2015. 
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The principal inspiration is the MSA2015 but with one substantial change: the MSA2015 is 
founded on specified criminal offences linked to slavery whereas no such basis exists for CFAs. 
Therefore, this article proposes integrating the approach of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
(the MLR2007) which focuses on improving institutional behaviour with respect to preventing and 
monitoring what Institutions suspect to be unauthorised Bank-to-State CFAs (cases where authority 
cannot be completely verified). This suspicion is defined analogously with MLR2007 and avoids 
requiring non-legally qualified actors to make an essentially legal judgement as to whether corruption 
linked to a Bank-to-State CFA is taking place, shifting the focus onto a more subjective risk assessment 
of the satisfaction of conditions precedent – such as written proofs of authorisation and ratification by 
state legislatures – already part of good banking practice. 
Analogous norms, such as the MSA2015 or MLR2007, all have a basis in a general legislative 
provision and so one would expect this proposal likewise to derive from legislative change. 
3.  Legislative Reform on Voidability of CFAs 
This option makes a small but effective statutory or legislative change to the existing common law to 
create a rebuttable presumption that Institutions have notice of any lack of authority of a state’s agent 
who attempts to bind the state to a Bank-to-State CFA. In other words, it is motivated by and builds on 
the legal analysis undertaken in Part III above.  
As we saw, the common law of state’s agent authority is out of sync with UNCTAD Principle 
3 in that a bank need not enquire terribly deeply as to the lack of authority of an agent, and a state may 
be bound even where an agent lacked actual authority or abused it.   
This article claims that this prevailing presumption is inappropriate in the context of Bank-to-
State CFAs.  Rather, the presumption, to be set out in statute, should be that Institutions are deemed to 
have notice of any want of authority of an agent unless the Institution has met certain ‘safe harbour’ 
conditions of due diligence. The best such safe harbour would be to register the Bank-to-State CFA on 
closing (section 1), giving the world notice of the transaction before drawdown.  
The effect of a finding of (deemed) notice of non-authorisation is that the state may not be 
bound by the Bank-to-State CFA. The Bank-to-State CFA is declared voidable, which means that the 
state may unilaterally opt to treat the Bank-to-State CFA as void.  If the state does decide to treat the 
Bank-to-State CFA as void, then it is as if the Bank-to-State CFA had never existed; the state is under 
no further obligations because the obligations never arose. If an Institution has disbursed funds, the 
funds have been transferred unilaterally and in error and the onus is on the Institution to recover them 
from whichever actual recipient of the funds, by means of certain technical procedures available for this 
purpose. 
Unlike the reporting requirement approach in section 2 above, the voidability approach catches 
all English law-governed Bank-to-State CFAs and it is for the Institution to ensure that appropriate due 
diligence is undertaken to overturn the presumption of lack of authority. This ought to be no difficulty 
for Institutions, given that CFAs normally require proofs both as part of their representations and 
conditions precedent, and this is in line with UNCTAD Principle 3. Yet such a fundamental change to 
private law would require primary legislation. 
 Conclusions on reform 
A combination of the registration and voiding options would provide the neatest ‘surgical’ reform with 
teeth sufficient to emend bank (and rogue official’s) behaviour. The registration or voidability option 
has the benefit of travelling a legal furrow well-known to English banks: a failure to register a floating 
charge already leads to the unenforceability of that security against third party creditors. Furthermore, 
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inverting the onus on due diligence to banks from states allocates burden and risk to the party most able 
to bear it in line with UNCTAD Principle 3. A registration requirement alone would still benefit from 
public oversight by civil society, and one would expect such transparency to be as effective as that 
provided for under the MSA2015. Yet no one can wait months for an annual report to disclose a 
problematic loan; states and civil society need to be able to respond in the crucial period between signing 
of the contract and drawdown. Furthermore, there are surely benefits in an ex ante voidability option 
mirroring the existing floating charge regime which places the burden on banks to undertake the due 
diligence we should surely expect of them and their professional advisors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In late June 2019, following representations by Jubilee Debt Campaign, the UK Labour Party adopted 
a proposal regarding the registration versus voidability law for CFAs. This proposal subsequently 
formed part of the Labour Party Manifesto in the December 2019 UK General Election. In January 2020 
Credit Suisse issued a counterclaim against Mozambique for recovery of the USD622m it claims is 
owing, Mozambique having attempted to obtain a legal declaration that the CFA in issue be cancelled 
(along with its guarantee).75 Once again English law will be the crucible for adjudicating claims between 
international capital and states, and once again a light will be shone on certain banking practices 
occurring in the City of London and involving branches of banks from around the world, practices 
benefitting from the current approach of English law. 
The empirical data sketch a context of increasing borrowing by Sub-Saharan states from private 
creditors, and borrowings which in some cases exceed 10 percent and even 24 percent of GDP. Further, 
the amounts owing under Bank-to-State CFAs, the legal instruments which are the focus of this article, 
have increased against this wider backdrop. This suggests that if English law continues to place the risk 
of an agent’s abuse of power on Low Income Country principals, rather than on the skilled banks and 
their advisors, we are likely to see an increasing number of cases in which English law and the City of 
London are brought into disrepute. It is hoped that this article can provide further momentum towards 
much needed reform. 
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